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Pandemic Continuity Planning: will coronavirus test local authority business 
continuity plans? A case study of a local authority. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper considers the potential impact of the coronavirus on a UK Local 
Authority’s ability to manage excess deaths, and models the potential impact of a 
50% clinical attack rate and a 1% and a 2.5% death rate. The case study was 
undertaken in 2019 prior to the coronavirus outbreak and was originally focussed on 
a pandemic flu epidemic, but the findings are relevant to the potential impacts of this 
new virus.  
During a pandemic, UK Local Authority (LA) death and bereavement services will be 
subject to an increase in workload and staff absences. Business continuity plans to 
ensure service continuity are required but uncertainty regarding the actual number of 
excess deaths makes accurate planning challenging. This paper models death rates 
in an authority in the north of England using the UK Government Cabinet Office’s 
National Planning Assumptions Assessment Tool, and, drawing on qualitative 
interviews with key stakeholders, considers how people working in death and 
bereavement services in a local authority would be able to cope. Findings suggest 
that although business continuity plans are in place, it is highly likely that the 
services will be overwhelmed even in the case of the lower mortality rate.   
 
 
Key Words: 
 
Coronavirus, Covid-19, Pandemic, Excess Deaths, Local Authority, Death Services, 
Business Continuity. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
At the time of writing Coronavirus has infected approximately 200,000 people 
globally and has resulted in the death of nearly 8,000 people since December 2019 
and on the 11th March, 2020 the World Health Organisation declared it a pandemic. 
(WHO, 2020). The virus, named COVID-19, started in China but has spread around 
the world resulting in nations closing their borders, governments imposing 
‘lockdowns’ on their citizens and global economic chaos. Accurate figures regarding 
the clinical attack rate or the mortality rates are currently difficult to confirm, but it is 
thought that  that each person infected transmits the virus to 2.5 people resulting in a  
‘clinical attack rate’ of between 60% and 80%. Estimations of the mortality rates tend 
to hover around 1%, but it could be lower, or higher (Battegay et al, 2020).  
The UK’s National Risk Register assesses significant potential threats and the 
number one risk has consistently been pandemic flu (Cabinet Office, 2008; 2010; 
2012; 2013; 2015; 2017).  The spread and impact of a new flu strain is difficult to 
Pandemic Continuity Planning: Kruger et al 
Emergency Management 4 (1) 2020  6 
 
predict and, once the pandemic begins, it can take between four to six months for a 
new vaccine to be developed, giving rise to a significant number of fatalities (Cabinet 
Office, 2017). The coronavirus, although not a flu strain, presents the same type of 
threat but with potentially more serious implications. 
Pandemics result in increased work absences causing disruption to essential health, 
education and emergency services.  The UK Home Office (2008) predicted that 
between 15% and 20% of staff from large organisations, and 30% to 35% for smaller 
establishments may be absent from work concurrently over a 2 to 3 week peak 
pandemic phase, although many will ‘return to normal activity within 7 to 10 days’ 
(Local Resilience Forums & Partnerships, 2017, pg.11). 
 
While the impact on medical staff and the UK’s National Health Service are of grave 
concern, and often attract the most attention, a pandemic would also significantly 
impact on death and bereavement services in local authorities. These include 
registrars, Coroners and mortuary services (cemetery workers and crematoria 
operators). Registrars are responsible for recording the details of all births, deaths, 
marriages and civil partnerships in their authority area, but among their duties is the 
requirement to inform the coroner if they suspect anything suspicious concerning a 
death.  The role of a coroner is to investigate deaths where the cause is unknown or 
uncertain, and when there is a reason to think that a death is suspicious. This can 
mean a simple consultation with the doctor who last treated the patient, or it could 
mean an inquest, a judicial inquiry, in order to determine the cause of death.  
 
Any ‘excess deaths’ will increase the workloads of all staff employed in death and 
bereavement services and staff shortages due to illness and care responsibilities 
would further compromise service delivery.  There is also likely to be a psychosocial 
impact on staff during a pandemic that will further undermine service delivery 
(Gierer, 2018). There are several studies that have looked at this from the 
perspective of medical staff (Matsuishi et al, 2012), but there is scant evidence on 
how this plays out for non-medical service providers during pandemics.  
 
To mitigate potential delays in death certificates being issued, backlogs in burials, 
cremations and mortuaries, and funeral parlours being filled beyond capacity, the 
Civil Contingencies Act 2004 placed a statutory duty on UK Local Authorities to 
produce and maintain business continuity plans.  These have, as yet, never been 
tested, so their contribution to managing the impact of an outbreak like coronavirus is 
unknown, but this paper attempts to assess the potential of one local authority to 
cope.  
 
Methodology 
 
This paper considers the capacity of death services in a northern English local 
authority to manage excess deaths resulting from a pandemic (for example, 
coronavirus).  A case study was selected as the most appropriate approach, defined 
as “an empirical method that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) 
in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (Yin, 2018, pg. 15). 
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This case study focusses on an anonymised Local Authority in northern England and 
presents evidence collected from a wide range of sources (Yin, 2018), including local 
and central government guidance documents, legislation, and interviews with 
employees engaged in the death management process (a senior emergency 
planning officer, a mortuary manager, a registrar and a bereavement services 
manager).  These interviews were conducted as a means of obtaining better 
explanations, such as the “hows”, “whens” and “whys” of key events, as well as the 
insights reflecting participants’ relative perspectives” (Yin, 2018, pg. 118). 
 
The Case Study 
 
The case study authority provides local government services for an area of 
approximately 150 square miles, with a population of nearly half a million (Office for 
National Statistics, 2017a) and is one of the largest Local Authority districts in 
England and Wales. The area’s current mortality rate is just under 4000 per year 
(Office for National Statistics, 2017b).  The council’s primary responsibilities within 
the death management process are to register deaths and dispose of the deceased, 
roles predominantly managed by registration and bereavement services, including 
the HM Coroner, all of which would be stretched in the event of a pandemic. 
 
Government guidance for managing excess deaths predominantly centres around 
‘working differently’, such as introducing shift work, increasing working hours, 
extending opening hours, focusing on crucial services, and redeploying staff from 
non-essential services (Home Office, 2008).  Registration and bereavement service 
managers have business continuity plans documenting plans to maintain staffing 
levels and manage significant increases in workload, but the difficulty is knowing how 
many deaths to plan for. Learning from historic pandemics might help to address 
some of this uncertainty. 
 
Previous Influenza Pandemics 
 
A flu pandemic occurs when ‘a new influenza virus emerges and spreads around the 
world, and most people do not have immunity’ (World Health Organisation, 2010).  
Several flu pandemics have emerged in the last century, the deadliest being the 
1918 ‘Spanish flu’ which caused approximately 50 million deaths worldwide.  In the 
UK, the pandemic lasted 46 weeks with one third of Britons becoming symptomatic, 
2.5% died resulting in 228,000 deaths, 25 times more than in a normal flu season 
(Honigsbaum, 2009). 
 
The Asian Flu in 1957 caused 1 million deaths worldwide and 33,000 in the UK, and 
the 1968 Hong Kong Flu, caused between 1 and 4 million deaths globally and 
30,000 in England and Wales (Department of Health, 2005).  In comparison, the 
2009 pandemic’s impact was relatively mild, with approximately 18,500 laboratory 
confirmed deaths reported worldwide and 457 deaths in the UK (Hine, 2010), 
although the true global figure has been estimated at 15 times that (Dawood et al., 
2012).  Table 1 summarises these figures. 
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Table 1: Summary of Flu Pandemic Deaths Worldwide and in the UK 
 
As viruses continue to mutate they are difficult to immunise against (Finnegan, 2018) 
and specialists have long agreed that the likelihood of a pandemic, such as 
coronavirus is high.  The pandemic is highly likely to test the continuity plans of local 
authorities across the world with the lack of certainty regarding clinical attack rates 
and mortality rates making it difficult for death services personnel to plan. 
 
Key Challenges 
 
The 1918 pandemic bore an exceptionally high death rate, and caused extreme 
situations, ‘in October deaths in London were running at 1,500 per week …people 
you saw one day were dead the next’ (Honigsbaum, 2009, pgs. 96 and 98).  
‘Families were badly affected, mothers and fathers were often stricken together, the 
children, themselves ill, could not receive attention’ (Report on Pandemic, 1920, pg. 
499, cited in Honigsbaum, 2009, pg. 102).   
‘…The dead and living in the same beds, no food in the house, no one able to 
crawl about to get it; hundreds of people starving because they couldn’t go out to get 
food; all delivery carts stopped, no one to drive them, shops shut…’ (The Times, 6 
January 1919, cited in Honigsbaum, 2009, pg. 146).  
This dystopian image may have seemed highly unlikley even a few weeks ago, but 
some reports from China suggest that the approach to containment has caused 
distress and potential human rights violations (New York Times, 2020).  
In 1918 the situation became so bad that it was impossible to manage the 
transportation, storage and burial of the dead, 
 
  “…Bodies lay unattended in crowded dwellings…covered wagons were 
dispatched to collect the bodies of people who had collapsed in the streets” (p499) 
 
 “People had to bury their relatives with their bare hands, often they were so 
weak they could only dig two or three feet deep, and as they turned to get the body 
they had brought, other people came and threw the bodies of their friends into the 
grave.  The subsequent fights were terrible” (p82) 
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 ‘”or a time, it seemed as if it would not be possible to get coffins for the dead or 
gravediggers to dig the graves…bodies were left as long as a fortnight unburied, 
partly at home, partly at mortuaries and partly at the premises of undertakers” (p146) 
(Honigsbaum, 2009). 
 
While the notion of mass graves may still seem unthinkable, there are unconfirmed 
reports that Iran is already preparing these in order to manage the excess deaths 
resulting from Covid-19 (Space, 2020).  
 
There is little contemporary literature regarding dealing with the dead during 
pandemics although the Ebola experience generated some insights into the 
concerns of relatives regarding the importance of transparent policies and practices 
for the correct recording and management of deaths (Abramowitz and Omidian, 
(2014).  There is, however, plenty of literature pertaining to the mitigation and 
management of deaths resulting from mass fatality incidents.  Mass fatality 
situations, such as earthquakes, tsunami, terrorist incidents, transport or industrial 
accidents, have death tolls limited to the specific event, a specific time period, and to 
a specific geographical area. In pandemics the number of victims continues to rise 
as the flu virus spreads. With mass fatality incidents neighbouring areas can provide 
additional personnel to support police and fire services, and provide mortuary space 
and administrative support. During a pandemic access to such resources will be 
limited as all areas will be experiencing similar pressures.   
 
Scanlon & McMahon (2011) argue that despite these differences, mass fatalities and 
pandemics have similarities, namely issues with paperwork, locating and 
transporting the dead and shortages of supplies and staff, such as coffins, body 
bags, medical provisions and cemetery workers.  They suggest that ‘no matter what 
planning approach is taken, that approach must include plans to deal with large 
numbers of dead’ (pg. 181).   
 
Table 2 summarises the key challenges, impacts and concerns surrounding 
pandemic deaths.  
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Table 2: Key Challenges to Service Provision: Potential impacts and concerns 
 
The Home Office and the Department of Health have produced advice to Local 
Authorities to plan for pandemic deaths and provide direction for regional and local 
plans and frameworks which, in turn, are used as reference guides for devising Local 
Authority Continuity Strategies. 
 
Planning for Excess Deaths 
 
Government guidance in a flu pandemic predicts that up to 50% of UK residents will 
experience flu symptoms (clinical attack rate) and, assuming a ‘worst-case scenario’, 
2.5% of symptomatic individuals will die if no effective treatment is received 
(mortality rate). Because of the anticipated availability of antivirals and antibiotics this 
mortality rate could be lower and central government advice is that plans should be 
made for a 1% mortality rate of symptomatic individuals over a 15-week period 
(Local Resilience Forums & Partnerships, 2017), in addition to routine everyday 
deaths. However, the uncertainty of attack rate and mortality means that fatalities 
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could be significantly lower, or higher. With regard to coronavirus, these two factors 
are still unknown, but there is some evidence to suggest that the clinical attack rate 
could be as high as 60-80% and the mortality rate, anything from 1 – 18%, but with 
most commentators assuming a rate of 2% (The Guardian, 2020).  
 
Planning in times of uncertainty is challenging and local authorities are advised to 
use the National Planning Assumptions Assessment Tool (Cabinet Office, 2011) 
which calculates what percentage of fatalities will occur within a given week over an 
estimated 15-weeks, as demonstrated in Figure 1 below. 
 
Pandemic 
Week 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Projected 
Percentage 
of 
Additional 
Deaths 
0 0 1 3 11 22 21 14 10 8 5 3 2 1 1 
Figure 1: Projected Percentage of Additional Deaths over a 15-week period (Home 
Office, 2008, pg. 14) 
 
The case study council’s basic data necessary for the use of the tool are shown 
below in Figure 2 (not all sources are referenced in order to maintain anonymity), 
and show that under normal conditions the body processing capacity is 120 deaths 
per week. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: National Planning Assumptions Assessments Tool (Cabinet Office, 
2011) 
 
 
Table 3 shows the calculations made by the assessment tool for an anticipated 
clinical attack rate of 50%, and a 1% mortality rate over a 15 week period. Resulting 
in a total of 2,188 (rounded up) additional deaths. 
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Table 3: Number of Additional Deaths for a pandemic with a 1% mortality rate  
(Cabinet Office, 2011) 
 
This is  below the current asssumed clinical and mortality rates for coronavirus, but 
even that suggests that UK authorities will struggle if it develops into a global 
pandemic. 
 
Table 4 reports the results of modelling a 2.5% mortality rate, which results in a total 
of 5,470 total additional deaths, a much more significant and challenging scenario. 
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Table 4: Number of Additional Deaths for a flu pandemic with a 2.5% mortality 
 rate (Cabinet Office, 2011) 
 
The personal tragedy and loss of such a pandemic will be unquantifiable and while 
the authors acknowledge this, the focus of this paper is on how authorities will 
manage the number of excess deaths. The impact of such an increase from normal 
levels will mean that the authorities will struggle to maintain death registrations and 
disposals that will potentially have serious consequences.  Practically, not being able 
to registering a death or obtain a death certificate will mean that disposal cannot take 
place. There will be a bottleneck of burials and cremations, causing ceremonies to 
be delayed with mortuaries filled beyond capacity. Families will be prevented from 
closing bank accounts, pensions, selling property or receiving insurance, which could 
have financial implications.   
 
Registration Services 
 
The authority can currently process 60 death certificates per day, approximately 300 
per week (Case Study Council, 2019).  However, the number of death registrations 
doesn’t necessarily equal the number of death certificates produced.  The original 
certificate is the Register and those registering the death purchase certified copies of 
the original entry.  Several certificates can be requested for the same death 
depending on the size of the decedent’s estate. The service currently has 21 
employees qualified to register deaths, and 5 who are death registration trained to 
provide cover.  The process takes 30 minutes and is carried out in person with the 
Registrar. The service is available 9am to 5pm Monday to Friday, 9am to12pm on 
Saturdays, with an on-call service provided from 10.30am to 11.30am on Sundays 
and Bank Holidays.  Section 16(3) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 
requires all deaths to be registered within 5 days of death. 
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Based on current capacity and the requirement for additional certificates, which, for 
illustrative purposes is set at 5 per registration, if facing a pandemic with a 1% 
mortality rate, the service would be beyond capacity within the first week, and 9 
times that by week 6, as indicated in Table 5 below.  
 
 
Table 5: Death certificates required at 1 % & 2.5% Mortality Rates at 5 per 
registration 
 
Should the service have to contend with a 2.5% mortality rate, it will also be beyond 
capacity by week 1, but almost 21 times that by week 6.  Evidently, whether faced 
with a 1 % or 2.5% mortality rate, registrars will struggle to maintain certificate 
production with current resources and so must make significant adjustments to 
increase production.  
 
Bereavement Services 
 
The Authority’s bereavement services is responsible for providing cremations and 
burials to residents, operating from 9am to 4pm, Monday to Friday and, according to 
management, conducting approximately 3,000 cremations and 500 burials per year.  
Disposals should be carried out swiftly following death registration to minimise the 
numbers of deceased stored at mortuaries and funeral parlours (Home Office, 2008). 
 
Fourteen cemetery workers can bury 6 individuals per day if digging individual 
graves, or 12 to 14 individuals for multiple interments, which equates to 
approximately 30 individual graves and 60 to 70 multiples per week (Case Study 
Council, 2019).  Multiple interments generally occur when family members die and 
are buried at the same site, but are rare.  
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It can one to two hours to dig a grave with an excavator, but a couple of days if 
digging by hand.  The depth of the grave depends on the number of bodies interred, 
4ft 6 for one interment, 6ft for two, 7ft 6 for three and 9 foot for four.  The ground 
conditions should also be considered, rocky and icy ground are challenging and 
other practical adjustments can increase the time required.  The service has two 
small teams who prepare the grave, carry out the interment, and backfill the site.  
 
During a pandemic, burials would increase significantly.  Table 6 below illustrates the 
total deaths over the 15-week period for 1% and 2.5% mortality rates and displays 
the approximate burials per week, calculated at 15% of total deaths.  
 
 
Table 6: Burial Numbers expected at 1% & 2.5% Mortality Rates for Individual & 
Multiple Interments.  
 
With a 1% mortality rate, the service will be beyond capacity by week 5 for individual 
interments, and week 6 for multiple interments, with burials peaking at 82 in week 6.  
At a 2.5% mortality rate the service faces well above 90 burials per week over a 5-
week period, peaking at 188 in week 6, more than six times the usual number of 
weekly individual burials, and almost 3 times the number for multiple interments.  
Without a significant injection of resources these will be extremely difficult to 
manage. 
 
The Authority conducts an average of 90 cremations per week (Case Study Council, 
2019).  Each cremation takes approximately 90 minutes and the service currently 
has 4 permanent cremator officers and 6 officers that are cremator trained. 
 
Table 7 below shows the total deaths over 15 weeks with mortality rates of 1% and 
2.5% and sets out the approximate cremations per week, accounting for 85% of total 
Pandemic Continuity Planning: Kruger et al 
Emergency Management 4 (1) 2020  16 
 
disposals.  As with burials, there is a significant increase in cremation numbers 
depending on whether a 1% or a 2.5% mortality rate is projected. 
 
 
Table 7: Cremation Figures expected at 1% % 2.5% Mortality Rates  
 
 
At a 1% mortality rate the service would exceed capacity by week 4 and for the 
subsequent 9 weeks.  At 2.5%, this increases to 13 weeks from week 3 meaning that 
there will be insufficient resources to deal with demand.   
 
 
Local Authority Business Continuity Plans 
 
Clearly an increase in the number of deaths entering the death management system 
will adversely impact capacity, and the higher the death toll, the more significant the 
impact.  The most pertinent issues would be staff shortages, lack of supplies, body 
storage, cemetery space and the unknown rate at which bodies and registration 
requests will reach the relevant services.  In June 2019, face to face, in-depth 
interviews were held with key personnel to determine how they intend to tackle these 
issues.  Each service is discussed in turn below, although the exact names and titles 
are withheld due to anonymity guaranteed during the interview process. 
 
Staff Shortages 
 
During a pandemic, business continuity plans for registration and bereavement 
services focus on increasing staffing levels to deal with the influx of work and 
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increased absence levels. One manager stated ‘…we will be down significantly on 
staff …we also assume our death figures will go shooting through the roof’.  The 
service therefore plans to increase capacity by utilising current staff members and 
 
“..are in the process of developing a quick training guide to register deaths, …once 
additional training is completed we could have at least 10 more staff from existing 
resources”. 
 
If additional staff are required the service intends to use retired staff or draft in 
people from other council services, hoping that ‘their work would decrease’ and that 
‘people would just slot staff into the critical services’. They also intend to streamline 
working practices, for example, by looking ‘at changing shift patterns and having an 
out-of-hours service’ and by adopting a ‘ticketing service’ where people would just 
turn up and register. The service also reported that on-line registration is currently 
unavailable, but being explored. 
 
Staffing levels are also problematic for Bereavement Services and the plan is to 
cremator train all grave diggers and back-office staff, increasing numbers from 10 to 
20 plus people. However, because training takes 3 to 4 months this might not be a 
timely intervention.  The service is considering using outside staff such as retired 
cremator operators (which could put older people at risk) and those who work 
through agencies, plus personnel from other local authorities.  To further increase 
capacity, the service also intends to increase the number of daily cremations to 12, 
(currently rate is 10) by having an extra morning and evening cremation. Cremators 
are only able to operate for 12 hours a day in order to keep the facilities operationally 
safe and to maintain the brickwork within.  In a full-blown pandemic these hours 
could be marginally extended but only for a short period.  
 
The capacity situation for burials is similarly restricted because of resource issues, 
“…the current daily capacity to dig graves for 6 individuals or 12 to14 multiples would 
be difficult to maintain for extended periods without additional resources such as 
extra help for digging from Highways who could operate JCBs”. 
 
The need for extra staff during a pandemic is less urgent for mortuaries as 
additional staff is only required during a mass fatalities incident, i.e. when 
multiple post mortems and Scenes of Crime Officers are required. In those 
situations the interviewee said that they normally got in extra staff from 
agencies to help out and work on rotation (e.g SOCO teams, Mortuary 
Technicians and Pathologists) and this might be possible in the case of a 
pandemic.  
 
Lack of Supplies and Inefficient Equipment 
 
Another concern is limited or unsuitable equipment and/or materials.  For 
Registration Services, the issue would be a reduced number of certificate stock and 
release forms,  
 
“…we only hold so many certificates and green forms in any one year, so one 
of the first things we do would be to immediately start rationing stock, this would be 
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one certificate per person and we would stop producing any but the most urgent 
copy certificates”.  
 
 
 
Limited Cemetery and Body Storage Space 
 
When mortality rates increase so does the need for body storage and cemetery 
space. This could be problematic, and one respondent said that  
“…certainly in some of the cemeteries we could end up going back to mass graves 
depending on the volume of excess deaths”. 
This would be highly controversial and could upset and anger many communities. 
One mortuary manager expressed concerns about body storage space, saying that 
“places that will back up will be the crematoria and the cemeteries, then the funeral 
directors won’t have any room and everything stops here”. 
This is an issue as staff will already have the usual deaths and post-mortems to 
contend with and already 
“…during the winter period we could have bodies in here for a few weeks, just 
waiting for a funeral…we are basically the store room and storage capacity is limited, 
we can only store 300 at any one time, if we get a flu pandemic we will be 
inundated…will have to call the Army”.   
When asked what the Army’s solution would be, he responded ‘they would probably 
store them in one big hangar, then you’ve got the logistics of finding and collating 
them all’. 
 
Unknown Rate of Influx 
 
There is also uncertainty surrounding the rate at which deaths would reach various 
Services.  For Registrars, the unknown is whether deaths would be delayed by the 
Coroner, with one respondent saying,  
 
“…we expect there would be a decision made at higher levels around doctors being 
able to record the death…so no need for a referral to the Coroner”’ and they thought  
that  
“..if all deaths were referred there would be a trickle into Registrars rather than being 
overwhelmed, resulting in slightly more work but over a much longer period”.  
 
However, one mortuary manager counters this saying  
“…chances are…people will be dying of something natural…so would they come 
here? Doctors would sign them off…we will only conduct an autopsy if the death is 
sudden and unexplained”. 
 
Bereavement Services also believe they will escape the immediate impact, 
 
“…the bottleneck might start before us and we will have bodies trickling in as the 
legal paperwork dictates, we are at the end of the chain”.  
 
Despite these contingency plans, all interviewees were uncertain as to what would 
happen during a true pandemic, claiming ‘we can only test this out once it actually 
happens’ with one asserting ‘pandemic flu is more likely to happen than a terrorist 
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attack, but we are not as prepared’. The familiarity of the occurrence and impact of 
terrorist attacks, and the prominence given to their threat and reality by government 
and media, means most people, and those working in Local Authorities are likely to 
prioritise planning for these events.  The last serious flu pandemic is beyond living 
memory and Local Authority personnel have no real experience to draw from.  
Although the interviewees appear to appreciate the potential threat of a pandemic, 
and have put good strategies in place, it is apparent these have limitations.  The 
following section explores the inadequacies of these proposals and considers the 
implications of failure, drawing on past experiences. 
 
A Critical Evaluation of Death Services Business Continuity Management 
 
The 1918 pandemic depleted the workforce and by November deaths were running 
at more than double the birth-rate, with mortuaries backed up due to body disposal 
difficulties (Honigsbaum, 2009).  Further issues arising from previous pandemics 
include a shortage of supplies and experienced personnel, as well as a pressing 
need for volunteers, (Scanlon et al, 2007), problems consistent with those that 
societies are still trying to safeguard against today. However, there are serious flaws 
to some of the current continuity plans. 
 
Registration Services are aware that during a pandemic their staffing levels will be 
considerably reduced and plan to increase staffing levels, limit the number of death 
certificates produced, reduce appointment times and extend service hours.    By 
limiting death certificates to one per person, the service may be able to produce the 
necessary numbers, however, at 2.5%, with 1,254 deaths in week 6 and 1,232 in 
week 7, it is unlikely (Table 5).  Although limiting death certificates to one per person 
may reduce workload certificates are essential for closing down financial accounts 
and selling property, so having a sufficient number is important. If more than one 
certificate per person is required, even at a 1% mortality rate, these contingency 
plans may not be adequate. 
 
The service is unsure how a pandemic will affect Coroner referrals and the issue of 
Medical Certificates of the Cause of Death (MCCDs), which could impact the rate at 
which death registrations reach the Service.  If all coronavirus related home deaths 
are referred on, registrations would trickle into the Service rather than overwhelming 
it. However, if these deaths bypass the Coroner, the Service could be inundated, 
particularly as deaths have to be registered within 5 days. Some clarification can be 
found in Government guidance documents which state that, during a pandemic 
situation, legislative amendments can be requested by Strategic Co-ordinating 
Groups (SCGs) to expedite the issue of the MCCDs and reduce Coroner referrals 
(Department of Health, 2012).  One such amendment would be to allow a registered 
medical practitioner, who has not attended the deceased in their last illness, to be 
able to certify those who appear, to the best of the physician’s knowledge, and 
based on the information available, to have died of coronavirus without needing to 
refer this on. The guidance also suggests contingency plans that may be more highly 
contentious. For example, because previous pandemics have resulted in high clinical 
attack rates in prisons, there is a suggestion that the usual high level of scrutiny of 
deaths in custody may be suspended in the event of a pandemic, with the 
requirement for inquests being reviewed. Clearly this approach has some risk. 
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Government contingency plans to avoid delays to  death registrations include the 
possibility of those needing to register a death not being required to attend in person, 
and being permitted to fax or email the MCCD to the Registrar.  This will allow the 
death to be registered, with the certificate and disposal documentation processed 
promptly and collected at a later date.  The requirement that deaths be registered 
within the first 5 days after death will still stand (Department of Health, 2012).   
 
Anyone who intentionally fails to register a death within the required timeframe will 
be subject to a fine (Registration of Births and Deaths Act 1953, s.36(e)), however 
this is unlikely to apply if the failure to register is due to delays at Registration 
Services.  Nevertheless there are circumstances where the 5 day rule can be 
excluded, for example, if a body is referred to the Coroner, a death cannot be 
registered until the investigations have been concluded. Also, if the Registrar is 
informed a medical certificate has been issued, registration can be delayed for a 
further 9 days, i.e. 14 days from date of death (Registration of Births and Deaths Act 
1953). 
 
A quick release of MCCDs and fewer Coroner referrals would mean an influx of work 
for Registrars, not the trickle they may be expecting and managers will need to plan 
accordingly.  Registrars will also have to deal with the rest of their everyday business 
such as births, which have to be registered within 42 days (Registration of Births and 
Deaths Act 1953), and any marriage ceremonies, postponements or cancellations, 
still have to be managed. 
 
At a 1% mortality rate, with additional staff and changes to working practices, it may 
be possible for the Bereavement Service to cope with an increase in burials of up to 
82 per week but they may struggle with 188 per week at 2.5%.  The service is relying 
on obtaining additional staff from other services to assist with manual tasks such as 
digging graves, but it is unclear whether these will be available.  Extending opening 
hours, increasing staff, having shorter timeslots for committals and encouraging 
funeral services to be held at local places of worship (Home Office, 2008) will allow 
an increase in interments but an increase will also depend on available staff, the 
condition of the ground, and whether “common burials” are to be used to increase 
cemetery space.  
 
Common burials or “mass graves” are controversial, conjuring up images of large 
trenches filled with bodies, akin to those during the Great Plague of 1665, or the 
Ebola crisis in West Africa, but these may become necessary during a crisis.  In 
2006 the Home Office considered using mass burials as part of their contingency 
plans to prepare for a future pandemic (Stones, 2006) but fortunately, due to the low 
UK death toll during the 2009  pandemic, this was never put into practice, but if it 
had, public acceptance could not be guaranteed. For such a suggestion to be 
publicly acceptable the Government would need to overcome many preconceptions 
and convince the public of the country’s need for it.  Changing the terminology and 
using the expression “collective burial, i.e. “where burials occur in a trench in rapid 
succession, each burial separate and identified” (West, 2006) may help in this case.  
These are generally used when either body storage capacity is overfull due to body 
disposal delays or as temporary interments due to an increase in demand on the 
Coroner’s service.  Once the crisis is over, the bodies are exhumed and autopsied, 
reburied or cremated as normal (West, 2006). 
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A further risk relates to any decision made to allow doctors who have not attended 
the individual in their last illness to certify cause of death which could be open to 
abuse.  The physician would make a death-by-coronavirus determination based on 
the evidence available, if there are no obvious reasons for doubting the cause, and 
the decedent’s representatives confirm the victim had been suffering from the virus, 
whether true or not, it is unlikely a post mortem examination would be requested. 
Risks could be mitigated by insisting on burials so that remains could be exhumed 
and re-examined should there be any suspicion over time. However, such a 
precaution would put added pressure on cemetery workers and deplete the cemetery 
spaces available.  
 
According to Bereavement Services, there are currently 5,574 burial plots still 
available in the case study Local Authority, excluding those plots pre-purchased and 
family graves.  If burials and cremation split remains at 15% and 85% there should 
be enough burial plots available within the Local Authority area, even at a 2.5% 
mortality rate where the total number of potential deaths amounts to 5,544 (although, 
for specific religious groups these figures may be different).  If the burial figures are 
considerably higher, Government recommends Local Authority collaboration with 
private sector churchyards to increase capacity (Home Office, 2008). However, 
difficulties may arise if a burial within a specific cemetery is requested. UK society 
consists of multiple cultures and faiths.  During a mass death situation, where some 
religions decree burial within a certain time, prioritising the needs of such groups 
may give rise to feelings of discrimination in others potentially leading to public 
disquiet and anger (Honigsbaum, 2009).  Local Authorities must work closely with 
multi-faith groups to ascertain precisely what will be necessary in such a situation 
and to gain understanding that, in certain circumstances, certain religious elements 
may need to be relinquished. 
 
During the 1918 pandemic, representatives from Sheffield, Manchester and Bethnal 
Green appealed to the National Service Board to release soldiers to help with burials 
(Honigsbaum, 2009).  Since military personnel will also be affected they cannot 
automatically be relied upon to provide aid as their main focus will be to “maintain 
critical military operations” (Department of Health, 2011, pg. 60). The Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004 requires Local Authorities to direct the response to any non-
military threats and emergencies to the UK, but when their capability is overwhelmed 
by a serious incident, the military may be petitioned to assist in the response, known 
as Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA).  The Ministry of Defence (MOD) must 
authorise any appeals for military aid but if there is an urgent need to protect life, 
local commanders are permitted to act under the authority of a 1983 Defence 
Council Order (Brooke-Holland, 2018).  
 
With a 1% mortality rate, 464 is the highest number of weekly cremations that can be 
processed over a 15-week period. With managers intending to significantly increase 
staffing levels through training back office staff, using previous staff members, and 
staff from other Local Authority departments, as well as agency workers, the service 
may be able to process these.  Although, with a 2.5% mortality rate the figures 
increase to just over 1,000 cremations in weeks 6 and 7 which will be beyond 
capability. With only 10 cremator trained officers, and training taking from 3 to 4 
months to qualify, there may not be sufficient people in place in time to deal with the 
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increase in cremations. Even former cremator officers require a couple of days of 
refresher training, and agency staff will be sought after by other Local Authorities.  
However, cremation figures could decrease if there is an insistence that burials be 
used instead, although opting for burial over cremation to reduce body storage 
issues and expedite the disposal process could have longer term implications.  
 
Exactly how quickly the deceased are going to come through for disposal is 
unknown.  In the normal process, after death, the body is either held at the public 
mortuary or sent to the funeral parlour.  Once the death has been registered funeral 
directors make arrangements on behalf of the family and the funeral or cremation 
takes place and the deceased transported to the grave site or crematoria (Home 
Office. 2008).  However, this may be different during a pandemic as funeral slots 
may be fully booked, funeral directors may become ill themselves, and death 
certificates may be delayed. These factors may result in funeral directors having 
insufficient storage space to meet demand or a delay in the rate at which death 
registrations and disposals are carried out, which, consequently puts pressure on 
body storage availability. 
 
Additional body storage would be required if disposals are delayed.  The Local 
Authority is required to provide this service under Section 198 of The Public Health 
Act 1936.  The hospitals in the case study authority have a combined body storage 
capacity of 110 units and the two crematoria can hold 6 bodies each (Case Study 
Council, 2019), amounting to 112 available body storage units pending burial or 
cremation.  In a normal situation this would likely be sufficient, however, not during a 
pandemic, although there are additional storage sites available if necessary.  
 
According to the Authority’s Excess Deaths Plan (2019), the first option for additional 
storage would be a neighbouring public mortuary, which is expected to have 
immediate temporary storage available for 150 bodies, with a maximum of 300 units. 
However, some may be in use, and should the mortuary exceed capacity, mutual aid 
will be sought from other Local Authorities, failing this, a temporary storage site will 
be activated.  There is currently only one such site within the case study area that 
can store approximately 144 bodies if using 12 x12 person body storage units, or 40 
persons if these units are unavailable.   The combined maximum body storage 
capacity available equates to approximately 556 spaces.  With the maximum number 
of deaths at a 1% mortality rate peaking at 546 in week 6 (Table 3), it is likely these 
body storage facilities would be sufficient, provided registrations, cremations and 
burials are processed in a timely manner.  Should there be any backlog, or the 
number of available spaces be less than anticipated, there is the option to hire and 
utilise appropriate refrigerated vehicles or containers.  However, if the mortality rate 
reaches 2.5% the maximum number of deaths in week 6 would peak at 1,254 (Table 
4), meaning these facilities would be insufficient, then consideration should be given 
to calling on national capabilities which may include utilising military facilities.  Since 
it is highly likely that other Local Authorities will be competing for mortuary space the 
resources the case study authority believe they have to fall back on may not be 
available.  
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Recommendations 
 
Both Registration and Bereavement Services know the death toll will increase during 
a pandemic but are unsure of the actual figures to plan for.  Underestimating the 
mortality rate could reduce the effectiveness of business continuity plans, whereas 
knowing what to expect will focus attention on the resources required. An option 
would be to have Escalating Business Continuity Plans, where the service prepares 
for a worst-case scenario, which can then be scaled back depending on the 
anticipated mortality rate. 
 
Services may need to legitimately ring-fence employees so that during periods of 
severe staff shortages their availability will be guaranteed. Since a key issue 
services face is severe staffing shortages, having official agreements within the 
business continuity documentation would help to expedite back up plans with 
managers knowing precisely where their additional staff are coming from, and 
ensuring any training can be carried out in a timely manner. Safeguarding staffing 
levels will also help counter impacts caused by those decisions made which are 
beyond Local Authority control, such as Coroner referrals.  For example, if the 
majority of coronavirus victims were to be referred, the flow of daily registrations and 
disposals in to the services would decrease, however, if they were not referred the 
flow would increase.  The impacts from these decisions could be further neutralised 
through producing flowcharts depicting alternative scenarios and the staffing 
numbers, equipment and supplies required for each.  These scenarios will allow 
managers to be better prepared, regardless of the decision made.  
 
From a technological standpoint, having an on-line registration service would be 
beneficial as it would speed up the death registration process, especially if people 
are too ill to attend.  On the other hand, this could be open to misuse as, with limited 
staff, the process may not have sufficient safeguards in place 
 
The discussion in this paper so far has focussed on what the case study Authority 
could do regarding pandemic planning.  The current regional framework, Local 
Resilience Forums & Partnerships, 2017, states it aims to ensure ‘a coordinated 
multi-agency response to minimise the impact of an influenza pandemic’  across its 
region and neighbouring region, however this ‘does not detract from the need for 
each partner organisation to maintain their individual plans’ (pg. 4).  The framework 
maintains that ‘the overall responsibility for the management of excess deaths lies 
with the relevant Local Authority’ (pg. 40) and that ‘local service providers will aim to 
maintain current process for as long as possible.  Should this become unsustainable, 
providers may need to work differently’ (pg.41). Finding ways of working differently is 
precisely what these Services have done, but it does not appear to be enough.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Local Authority death management services are likely to be severely affected during 
the coronavirus pandemic. Government documentation advocates the notion of 
‘working differently’ in order to maintain service delivery and these form the basis of 
the continuity plans for the case study local authority. However, death, bereavement 
and coronial services have been severely stretched and under-resourced for years 
and the continuity plans for working differently are insufficient. Services will  try to 
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plug their capacity gaps by borrowing staff, equipment and body storage space from 
other services, using agency workers and hiring plant, but their assumption that 
these resources will be available is potentially misplaced. A more cohesive national  
approach that pools resources for death management services might be more 
effective during a pandemic so that staff, stock and equipment could be shared 
between authorities and, should the worse case scenario arise, a national 
perspective on collective burials might be more workable.  
 
Even before the coronavirus outbreak The Local Government Association (2020) 
have argued specifically for a national coronial service that would have greater 
national oversight and consistency.  Such a development would help to address 
some of the issues identified in this paper. However, change in death services is 
notoriously slow. In 2004 the Shipman Inquiry concluded that a restructuring of the 
coroner’s system was required in order to strengthen the death investigation system 
and promote greater dialogue between coroners, the public and medical 
professionals (Smith, 2004).  It has taken until 2018 for progress to be made (Luce 
and Smith, 2018) so it is unlikely that any change to coronial services will happen 
fast enough to deal with the current coronavirus threat.  Decisions and changes in 
practice will be made ‘on the hoof’ but coronavirus may well be the catalyst for more 
effective excess death planning. As Scanlon and McMahon (2011) assert on page 
181, ‘Dealing with the dead has been a problem in pandemics for centuries. That is 
not likely to change’. 
 
This paper has taken an operational perspective on the challenges posed by the 
coronavirus pandemic. The focus has been on the operational implications to a Local 
Authority service but the issues this paper raises are primarily about people and how 
we, as a society treat our citizens in life and in death. In a pandemic situation there is 
likely to be a necessary change to the ‘business as usual’ death and bereavement 
management services.1 How humanely these are managed is hugely important for 
those affected at the time of crisis, and the humanity of the government’s response 
will reflect the nature and values of our society, and will be judged accordingly.    
                                                          
1 The COVID-19 situation is changing hourly and at the time of publication there are reports from 
Italy of funeral services being overwhelmed, a shortage of coffins, and the army being enlisted to 
transport corpses to storage facilities (The Guardian, 2020). 
In the UK, emergency legislation for managing the dead is being considered. The Coronavirus Bill 
2020 includes such key elements as : coroners only needing to be notified when there is no medical 
practitioner to sign the death certificate (or not being able to do so within a reasonable amount of 
time since the death); changes to the Burial and Cremation (Scotland) Act 2016  regarding the 
collection of ashes, and a relaxing of the criteria for which family members can complete the 
cremation application form; funeral directors being allowed to register some deaths; the use of 
electronic documents for the registration of deaths; lifting of the need for second confirmatory 
medical certificates before cremations can go ahead and relaxing the requirement for jury held 
inquests into Covid-19 deaths. It is also possible that local authorities will be able to ask death and 
bereavement actors (funeral directors, mortuaries, crematoria) to streamline their processes by 
implementing some of the interventions discussed in this paper, such as increasing the operating 
times of crematoriums and to use other agents to assist in logistics (Department of Health and Social 
Care, 2020).  
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